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As a first step toward an emergentist theory of collective 
cognition in collaborative problem solving, we present a 
proto-theoretical account of how one might conceive and 
model the intersubjective processes that organize collective 
cognition into one or another—convergent, divergent, or 
tensive—cognitive regime. To explore the sufficiency of our 
emergentist proposal we instantiate a minimalist model of 
intersubjective convergence and simulate the tuning of 
collective cognition using data from an empirical study of 
small-group, collaborative problem solving. Using the results 
of this empirical simulation, we test a number of preliminary 
hypotheses with regard to patterns of interaction, how those 
patterns affect a cognitive regime, and how that cognitive 
regime affects the efficacy of a problem-solving group. 
Introduction 
Collaborative problem solving presents a coordination 
challenge (Lewis, 1969): the timing and efficacy of top-
down processes—the means-ends operations—whereby a 
group wends its way through the problem space, depend on 
the timing and efficacy of bottom-up processes, whereby 
heterogeneous agents evolve and propagate shared 
intentions, goals, beliefs, and conceptions (Clark & 
Brennan, 1991). Absent this intersubjective convergence (cf. 
Roschelle, 1992), collaborators cannot define (perhaps not 
even recognize) the problem at hand nor select among the 
possible solutions, much less take action (Katz & 
Lazarsfeld, 1955). Luckily, collaborators tend, over time, 
toward psychological homogeneity (for review see Arrow, 
McGrath, & Berdal, 2000). In fact, human beings appear 
hard-wired for sharing psychological states (Tomasello et. 
al, 2005); the urge to converge has adaptive value—i.e. 
survival of the groupiest (e.g. Axelrod, 1984). That said, the 
efficiency gains afforded by complete and uncritical 
consensus—groupthink—come with adaptability costs, as 
well (Janis, 1982); collaborators proceed with cognitive 
myopia, leaving much of the problem and solution spaces 
unexplored. Some groups manage to generate and sustain 
sufficient tension between the intersubjective convergence 
necessary for concerted action and the divergence necessary 
for cognitive flexibility; other groups lurch towards one 
extreme or another. How do groups tune the levels of their 
collective cognition; why and when do some groups succeed 
and others fail?  
Collective Cognition: Supervenient, Yet Distinct 
One word, emergence, provides an easy answer. Collective 
cognition—whether convergent, divergent, or at some 
tension point between the two—emerges from the 
intersubjective interactions—discussion, negotiation, and 
speculation—among collaborating agents; each interaction, 
in relation to every other interaction, tunes collective 
cognition both in time and over time. Invoking emergence 
only begs the question: how, when, and why does collective 
cognition emerge? Among cognitive scientists, interest in 
collective cognition and its emergence is a recent 
phenomenon (e.g. Goldstone, 2005); existing theories (e.g. 
Hutchins, 1995) detail how collective cognition propagates 
once structured and institutionalized, but a theory of its 
emergence remains forthcoming (Schwartz, 1995). The need 
for a theory stems from the cumulative effect of empirical 
research indicating that intersubjective processes yield 
cognitions—e.g opinions (Isenberg, 1986), knowledge 
representations (Schwartz, 1995), decisions (Bornstein & 
Yaniv, 1998), among others—that differ, both in complexity 
and kind, from those produced by any collaborating agent or 
those expected from the central tendency among 
collaborators (Vallacher & Nowak, in press). Moreover, 
these group-level cognitions emerge spontaneously, without 
forethought or awareness among collaborating agents 
(Goldstone, 2005). Apparently, the interactions among 
collaborators generate a mind—supervenient, yet distinct 
from any constituent mind—requiring cognitive inquiry in 
its own right.  
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Emergence: Unpacking the Paradox 
Despite newfound enthusiasm, the road to an emergentist 
theory of collective cognition remains littered with 
obstacles. Foremost, emergence presents a definitional 
paradox: on one level, emergent phenomena depend on 
underlying variables and processes; on another level, 
emergent phenomena remain autonomous from underlying 
variables and processes (Bedau, 2003). This paradox 
complicates the ontological, causal, and explanatory 
derivation of emergent phenomena. First, the ontological 
derivation of an emergent phenomenon is informationally 
complex (ibid.). This means that one could reduce collective 
cognition to its constituent psychological variables (as 
manifest by intersubjective interactions), however, one 
could not derive collective cognition without full 
information on how those variables aggregate and interact. 
Second, the causal derivation of an emergent phenomenon 
is informationally complex (ibid.). One could reduce 
collective cognition to its current configuration of 
psychological variables, but one could not derive collective 
cognition without full information on the history of 
intersubjective interactions that led to that configuration. 
Third, no particular ontological or causal derivation can 
explain an emergent phenomenon (ibid.). Over the duration 
of the problem-solving process, collective cognition may 
organize into a variant of three—convergent, divergent, or 
tensive—attractors or change-resistant cognitive regimes. 
Apparently similar configurational histories may organize 
very different cognitive regimes, while apparently different 
configurational histories may organize similar cognitive 
regimes. Fourth, an emergent phenomenon propagates the 
ontological and causal conditions from which it derives 
(ibid.). Intersubjective interactions may organize collective 
cognition into a particular regime, but the regime 
downwardly constrains the intersubjective interactions by 
which collective cognition propagates. All in all, an 
emergent phenomenon, itself, offers the shortest 
description—ontological, causal, and explanatory—of its 
own emergence (ibid.); collective cognition is 
algorithmically irreducible.  
Deriving the Irreducible: A Minimalist Approach 
The algorithmic irreducibility of emergent phenomena 
precludes any short cut derivation of collective cognition: 
one must recapitulate the full ontological and causal history 
from which collective cognition emerged—i.e. derivation by 
simulation (ibid.). At first glance, derivation by simulation 
appears tedious, perhaps intractable: for one, the full 
ontological and causal history of collective cognition 
involves multi-level causal dynamics operating on multiple, 
permuting variables; further, as argued above, no particular 
ontological or causal derivation can explain collective 
cognition. Algorithmic irreducibility, one might suspect, 
also precludes a parsimonious theory of collective 
cognition. Then again, the ontological and causal history of 
collective cognition entails, at each point in time, a finite set 
of local intersubjective interactions; each local interaction 
entails only local dynamics operating on local variables. 
This enables a minimalist approach to derivation by 
simulation (cf. Nowak, 2004): one need only model the 
minimal information—e.g. utility function, decision rule, or 
heuristic—contained in a local interaction; through repeated 
updating of aggregated local interactions, the simulation 
generates the phenomenon—in all its informational 
complexity—from the bottom up (ibid.). Employing a 
minimalist, bottom-up approach to derivation by simulation, 
an emergentist theory of collective cognition need not 
sacrifice explanatory depth and richness for parsimony 
(ibid.); Ockam can put away his razor.  
Computational Models: Life-Like Is Like Life 
Computational models of collective behavior and collective 
psychology exemplify the minimalist, bottom-up approach 
to derivation by simulation. (for reviews see Goldstone, 
2005 and Vallacher & Nowak, in press). For instance, the 
dynamical implementation of Social Impact Theory 
(Nowak, Szamrej, & Latané, 1990) simulates how polarized 
clusters emerge in public opinion. In the theory and in the 
simulation, social influence operates via two interlocking 
mechanisms: the group influences each person, and each 
person influences the group. The intensity of that influence, 
both group-on-person and person-on-group, derives from a 
function of three variables: group size, personal 
persuasiveness, and personal position in physical (or social) 
space. During the course of discussion—i.e. the iterative 
application of the social influence function to each group-
on-person and person-on-group interaction—the simulation 
evolves from an initial random distribution of opinions to a 
distribution of opinions not unlike that in the real world: 
islands of minority opinion in a sea of majority opinion. 
One finds similarly plausible patterns of collective behavior 
and thought in simulations that model higher-dimensional 
cognitive structures, yet lower-dimensional mechanisms of 
social influence; global systems of cultural knowledge 
(Kennedy’s, 1998) and meaning (Barr, 2004) can emerge—
with surprising efficiency—from local, person-to-person 
exchanges of partial knowledge. Verisimilitude—the 
plausibility of behavior and thought patterns—lends 
explanatory power to computational models. If simple 
mechanisms operating on minimal variables produce 
realistic phenomena in a simulated world, perhaps the same 
simple mechanisms operating on the same minimal 
variables produce real phenomena in the real world (Nowak, 
2004).  
Two Routes to Theory Building 
Computational models, thus, offer one way to understand 
how, when, and why a collaborative, problem-solving group 
succeeds or fails in tuning the levels of its collective 
cognition. One could implement any number of minimalist, 
hypothetical models and validate the results against 
empirical data (Goldstone, 2005). The model whose 
aggregate iteration produces the most plausible patterns of 
collective behavior and thought likely underlies the process 
by which real-world collective cognition emerges and 
propagates (Nowak, 2004). Thus, verisimilitude proves 
essential to the theory-building efforts of those trying to 
understand collective behavior and collective psychology. 
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That said, a reliance on verisimilitude may strain one’s 
evidentiary standards (Goldstone, 2005); for instance, while 
one might rely on the verisimilitude of Shakespeare’s King 
Lear to make sense of observed familial dysfunction, one 
might hesitate to claim that the contrived vicissitudes of a 
fictional family—no matter how plausible—can explain the 
observed vicissitudes of an actual family. In response to this 
wariness, one could follow an empirical route to derivation 
by simulation: beginning, again, with a minimalist, 
hypothetical model of a local intersubjective interaction, one 
could use empirical (as opposed to computer-generated) 
data to update the aggregated local interactions at each 
iteration of the simulation. The empirical route, though, 
comes with its own limitations. For one, life rarely 
maintains a time-ordered log of intersubjective interactions; 
one must rely on data from laboratory experiments, where 
sample size, time scale, and transparency rarely match the 
levels available in computational experiments. Further, the 
intersubjective interactions of human collaborators involve a 
panoply of discursive instruments—analogies, jokes, lies, as 
well as propositions; before proceeding with simulation, one 
must translate these discursive instruments—via some 
theory-based process—into simple mechanisms operating 
on minimal variables. Despite these limitations, empirical 
simulations avoid validation by verisimilitude; the simulated 
patterns of behavior and thought are not simply life-like, 
they are life. One can expect empirical validation to 
supplement, if not supplant, verisimilitude in building an 
emergentist theory of collective cognition in collaborative 
problem solving.  
Collective Cognition: An Emergentist Proposal 
Before one can proceed—whether via computational or 
empirical simulation—with building a emergentist theory of 
collective cognition in collaborative problem solving, one 
needs a proto-theoretical account of the phenomenon to 
guide how one might conceive and model the 
intersubjective interactions whose aggregate iteration 
organize collective cognition into one or another—
convergent, divergent, or tensive—cognitive regime. While 
speculative, such an account would allow one to generate a 
number of preliminary, yet testable, hypotheses with regard 
to patterns of intersubjective interaction, the effect of those 
patterns on the stability of a cognitive regime, and the effect 
of a cognitive regime on the problem-solving efficacy of a 
collaborative group. To that end, we offer the following 
emergentist proposal: 
How, when, and why does a collaborative, problem-
solving group succeed or fail in tuning the levels of its 
collective cognition and, thereby, tuning the levels of its 
problem-solving efficacy? As indicated earlier, a 
collaborative, problem-solving group must coordinate the 
bottom-up manipulation of intersubjective variables—
intentions, goals, beliefs, and conceptions—with the top-
down manipulation of problem-related or instrumental 
variables. Both manipulations operate via the same 
mechanism, intersubjective interaction—the discussion, 
negotiation, and speculation through which collaborating 
agents generate and enact a shared representation of the 
problem and its solution. Each successive interaction 
reconfigures both intersubjective and instrumental variables 
in such a way that may, in relation to the reconfigurations of 
previous interactions, increase or decrease the need for 
further discussion, negotiation, and speculation: i.e. each 
successive interaction impacts the level of convergence 
among collaborating agents and, thereby, the efficiency of 
the ensuing problem-solving process. Given the 
coordinative interdependence between instrumental and 
intersubjective levels of convergence, one can expect 
interactions that generate convergence/divergence on one 
level to follow on interactions that generate 
convergence/divergence on the other level. Thus, each 
interaction may constrain the valence—convergent, 
divergent, or neutral—of the succeeding interaction, 
creating clusters of interactions with a similar impact on 
both convergence levels and efficiency. These clusters or 
tiny attractors (cf. Kauffman, 1993), in turn, constrain the 
overall trajectory of the problem-solving process: recurring 
tiny attractors push the discussion, more and more, in one 
direction, organizing a cognitive regime—i.e. a major 
attractor. With the regime in place, similarly valenced 
interactions—both singly and in clusters—increase in 
likelihood; while one might observe convergent interactions 
in a divergent regime or divergent interactions in a 
convergent regime, these perturbations have little impact on 
the direction of the discussion. A group whose cognitive 
regime tends towards divergence remains mired in 
disagreement and indecision: collaborating agents cannot 
find a mutually satisfactory solution. A mutually 
satisfactory solution comes easily for collaborating agents 
whose cognitive regime tends towards convergence, but that 
solution reflects the monolithic tendencies of the group. A 
multidimensional solution requires multidimensional 
intersubjective processes; one can expect such a solution 
from a group whose collective cognition tends toward a 
tensive cognitive regime.  
Purpose 
In what follows, we explore, via empirical simulation, the 
sufficiency of our emergentist proposal of how, when, and 
why a collaborative, problem-solving group succeeds or 
fails in tuning the levels of its collective cognition and, 
thereby, tuning the levels of its problem-solving efficacy. 
Specifically, we instantiate one minimalist model of 
intersubjective convergence and simulate the tuning of 
collective cognition using data from an empirical study of 
small-group, collaborative problem solving. Finally, we 
present a sequence of explorations, each of which tests, 
using the results of the empirical simulation, one or two 
preliminary hypotheses.  
Method 
Research Context and Data Collection 
The data for this empirical simulation come from a study of 
collaborative triads solving problems in an online, 
synchronous chat environment. That study looked at the 
effects of problem structure—e.g. well- structured or ill-
structured problems—on the nature and efficacy of 
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computer-mediated collaboration; problem structure 
functions as a control variable in our explorations. 
Participants included sixty 11th grade students (46 male, 14 
female; 16-17 years old) from the science stream of a co-
educational, English-medium secondary school in 
Ghaziabad, India. They were randomized into twenty triads, 
each of which had to collaborate in solving a well-structured 
or ill-structured problem scenario. Both problems asked 
groups to determine liability in an automobile accident; 
solutions required the application of Newtonian kinematics. 
The study took place in the school’s computer laboratory, 
where collaborators communicated with one another 
entirely through synchronous, text-only chat. The chat 
server archived a time-ordered transcript of each group’s 
discussion. These twenty transcripts serve as the data 
driving both the simulation and subsequent analyses. 
Operationalizing Intersubjective Convergence 
As a conceptual domain, Newtonian kinematics is 
ontologically direct: known problems have a small set of 
known solutions. In solving kinematics problems, a group’s 
intersubjective processes must converge on this small set of 
normative concepts, strategies, and solutions: i.e. the 
instrumental and intersubjective dimensions of the problem-
solving processes collapse to one dimension. Consequently, 
one can think of the problem-solving process as a walk 
along a straight path: success and failure await at either end. 
With each intersubjective interaction, a group may step 
forward (convergent valence), step backward (divergent 
valence), or stand still (neutral valence). The mean distance 
traveled along this path represents a group’s overall 
convergence—their proximity to the small set of normative 
concepts, strategies, and solutions. Operationally, then, one 
can model both the problem-solving process and the 
resulting overall convergence as a Markov walk (Ross, 
1996).  
For the purposes of empirical simulation, two trained 
doctoral students independently segmented the twenty 
transcripts into semantically-defined, interaction units: i.e. 
each utterance was divided into each constituent phrase—
variable identification, strategy suggestion, solution 
evaluation, et al.—that could impact the group’s level of 
convergence and problem-solving efficiency. Following 
segmentation, the coders assigned an impact value of 1, -1, 
or 0 to each interaction unit (Krippendorff’s alpha = .93) 
depending upon whether, in relation to previous 
interactions, the interaction represented a step forward 
(impact = 1), a step backward (impact = -1), or no step at all 
(impact = 0). In this way, each discussion, with its panoply 
of discursive instruments, was reduced to a temporal string 
of 1s, -1s, and 0s. At any point in the problem-solving 
process, a group’s overall convergence derives from a 
function of those of 1s, -1s, and 0s. More formally, at any 
point in the problem-solving process, let n1, n-1, and n0 
denote the number of interaction units assigned an impact 
value of 1, -1, and 0, respectively. Then, up to that point, the 
convergence value would equal, C = (n1 – n-1)/(n1 + n-1). 
To run the simulation, we calculated a convergence value 
after each utterance; for each of the 20 discussions, this 
generated a notional time series representing the evolution 
of each group’s collective cognition.  
Operationalizing Problem-Solving Efficacy 
Throughout our explorations, a group’s ultimate, problem-
solving efficacy—the accuracy and quality of its solution—
serves as either a criterion or predictor. As argued earlier, 
multidimensional solutions indicate an efficacious problem-
solving process: i.e. an efficacious group will produce not 
only a correct solution, but a solution with a variety of 
quantitative and qualitative arguments. Two doctoral 
students independently assessed the accuracy and quality of 
each solution based on a nine-point rubric (Krippendorff’s 
alpha = .97). 
Results and Discussion 


















Figure 1:  Four illustrative fitness curves. 
 
Plotting the convergence value on the vertical axis and time 
(defined notionally, with each utterance a tick on an 
evolutionary clock) on the horizontal axis, one can visualize 
the evolution of each group’s collective cognition (Figure 
1). Three aspects—end point, length, and shape—of this 
visualization or fitness curve appear informative. The end 
point of each curve indicates the final level of convergence, 
from which one can deduce each group’s proximity to the 
small set of normative concepts, strategies, and solutions. 
The length of each curve indicates the duration of each 
problem-solving process: i.e. the efficiency with which each 
group reached its final solution, however proximal to the 
normative set. 
The shape of each fitness curve appears the most 
informative aspect of all. For instance, the early portion of 
each curve indicates whether apparently similar initial 
processes lead to different trajectories, while apparently 
different initial processes lead to similar trajectories. In 
Figure 1, both of the low-efficacy groups—whether solving 
a well- or ill-structured problem—tuned their collective 
cognition to similarly low levels of convergence; yet, each 
arrived at those final levels via different paths. After some 
initial positive steps, the convergence level among 
collaborators in the Low/Well group declined sharply then 
plateaued. The Low/Ill group, on the other hand, appeared to 
recover from their initial missteps, before they too plateaued 
in divergent terrain. These fitness plateaus—evident both 
among the high-efficacy and low efficacy groups—offer 
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preliminary evidence for the existence of cognitive regime 
and its effects on a group’s problem-solving efficacy: a 
convergent regime among groups with high-efficacy 
outcomes, a divergent regime among groups with low-
efficacy outcomes. One should note that no group plateaued 
at one extreme or another: as one would expect from 
interacting human beings, low-efficacy groups generated 
some minimal level of convergence; more importantly, 
high-efficacy groups appear to have sustained enough 
divergence to explore a wide swath of the problem and 
solution spaces.  
Given this visual evidence for an early-emerging 
cognitive regime and its correspondingly early effects on 
problem-solving efficacy, we now explore this relationship 
through statistical means. 
Exploration 2: The Cognitive Regime 
One way to verify the existence and effect of a cognitive 
regime involves testing how early and how consistently one 
could predict (with p-values ≤ 0.05) a group’s eventual 
problem-solving efficacy from the level of convergence. For 
the purposes of this test, we segmented the twenty 
discussions into ten equal parts; then, at each tenth, we 
calculated the convergence value up to that point. This 
resulted in ten sets of twenty convergence values: the first 
set (C1) corresponding to convergence after 10% of the 
discussion, the second set (C2) after 20% of the discussion, 
and so on until the tenth set (C10), corresponding to the 
final convergence value. To simulate the temporal effects of 
cognitive regime we regressed problem-solving efficacy on 
C1, then C2, and so on through C10, controlling for 









































Figure 2:  Simulating the predictive power of convergence. 
 
To visualize the simulation we plotted the p-value that 
corresponded to the statistical significance of each 
regression (Figure 2). The data suggest that, beginning at 
some point between 30% and 40% into the problem-solving 
process (between C3 and C4) through to its end, the level of 
convergence can, on average, predict (with p-values ≤ 0.05) 
the eventual problem-solving efficacy. The simulation 
confirms not only that interacting agents do, in fact, 
organize their collective cognition into a cognitive regime, 
but that they do so early and with consistent consequences. 
Having verified the early emergence and predictive power 
of a cognitive regime or main attractor, we next identified 
and assessed the tiny attractors that organize the regime and 
maintain its immunity to perturbations.  
Exploration 3: Tiny Attractors 
Earlier, we defined tiny attractors as sustained sequences or 
clusters of interactions with the same valence. Lag 
Sequential Analysis (LSA) detects various non-random 
patterns in a given sequence of interactions; specifically, we 
looked for statistically significant autocorrelations 
(Bakeman & Gottman, 1986)—instances where an 
interaction with a particular impact value followed on an 
interaction with the same impact value. From these 
statistically significant autocorrelations, one might induce 
that similarly-valenced interactions were sustained, with 
greater likelihood, in stochastic clusters (tiny attractors) 
rather than spread randomly throughout the discussion. As 
expected, high-efficacy groups were 133% more likely to 
sustain convergent interactions, while low-efficacy groups 
were 120% more likely to sustain divergent interactions. In 
each case, recurring tiny attractors pulled the discussion into 
one or another cognitive regime with the expected efficacy 
outcomes. 
At this point, one might wonder whether this emergentist 
account of collective cognition and its derivation by 
empirical simulation add anything, over and above previous 
research, to one’s understanding of collaborative problem 
solving? To answer this question, one would need to 
instantiate and test the minimalist model of intersubjective 
convergence in a number of other problem-solving contexts. 
That said, we provide a preliminary answer by comparing 
the predictive power of our convergence model with that of 
other commonly used predictors.  
Exploration 4: Convergence vs. Other Predictors 
Previous research suggests several ways to model the 
problem-solving process as a function of convergent and 
divergent interactions. These models rarely account for the 
full ontological and causal history from which collective 
cognition emerged. One model might account for the 
number of convergent interactions (Frequency = n1). 
Another model might account for the relative number of 
convergent interactions (Relative Frequency = n1/[n1 + n0 + 
n
-1]), i.e. convergent interactions as a proportion of all 
interactions. Yet another model might account for the 
difference between the number of convergent and divergent 
interactions (Position = n1 - n-1). Using multiple regression, 
we simultaneously compared the significance of all four 
models—frequency, relative frequency, position, and 
convergence—in predicting problem-solving efficacy 
(controlling for problem structure).  
 
Table 1:  Regression Parameter Estimates. 
 
  B SE F p 
(Constant) -3.000 1.382 4.716 0.048 
P. Structure 0.213 0.236 0.811 0.383 
Convergence 7.578 1.891 16.059 0.001 
Frequency 0.019 0.018 1.109 0.310 
Position -0.040 0.022 2.505 0.136 
Rel. Freq. 1.885 2.198 0.735 0.406 
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 Among the four predictors, only convergence 
recapitulates enough of the ontological and causal history to 
significantly predict problem-solving efficacy (F = 16.059, 
p =.001): the data support our earlier contention that 
collective cognition is algorithmically irreducible. This 
result hints at the further insights to be gained from 
investing effort and resources in an emergentist theory and 
methodology.   
Implications 
Our explorations reveal a number of preliminary, yet 
compelling, insights into the nature and dynamics of 
collective cognition in collaborative problem solving. As 
proposed, collective cognition emerges from the 
intersubjective interactions among collaborating agents. 
Each interaction both tunes the level of intersubjective 
convergence and constrains each subsequent interaction: 
e.g. convergent interactions promote convergent 
interactions. These tiny attractors organize a major attractor: 
a cognitive regime that constrains all subsequent 
interactions and, thereby, the outcome of collaborative 
efforts. This self-organizing process takes hold early in the 
collaboration. Consequently, one can predict, early on, 
whether a problem-solving group will succeed or fail. These 
insights have epistemological, methodological, and practical 
implications. At the epistemological level, our findings 
challenge an epiphenomenal view of collective cognition: 
while supervenient on the intersubjective interaction among 
collaborating agents, collective cognition has very real 
consequences. Concomitantly, our findings support a shift 
away from the individual as the locus of all cognitive 
activity: collective cognition derives neither from any 
collaborating agent nor from the central tendency among 
collaborators. Because collective cognition exists only in the 
interactions among agents, its derivation requires a 
theoretical and methodological shift from short-cut causal 
models to process-oriented, emergentist models—i.e. 
derivation by simulation. We took a minimalist approach to 
designing our model of intersubjective convergence, 
abstracting the problem-solving process to the simplest 
mechanism operating on the minimal number of variables. 
One can model almost any goal-directed activity, in any 
number of dimensions, using a Markov Walk; hence, our 
model provides a platform for further research and, through 
that research, for the development of a more sophisticated 
model. All in all, our emergentist proposal and its empirical 
simulation could serve as the first among many steps that 
may lead to a fully-developed emergentist theory of the 
collective cognition in collaborative problem solving and, 
further on, to a theory applicable to collective action of all 
kinds.  
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